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ABSTRACT

The Hispanic population in the United States is growing in numbers, is characterized by diversity, and its growing impact on American society has caused the Ford Foundation to explore new Foundation initiatives. The 1980 census counted 14.6 million Hispanics on the U.S. mainland: 60% Mexican American, 14% Puerto Rican, 6% Cuban, and 20% other. The Hispanic population is characterized by rapid growth attributed to high fertility and high immigration rates, and possibly also to improved census methods); a relatively low median age of 23 years; and a low socioeconomic level based on income, education, and employment considerations. Statistics indicate that Hispanics fall between blacks and whites in median family income, that some 30% of Hispanic families fall below the official poverty level compared to 12% of non-Hispanic white families, and that Hispanic unemployment is about 60% higher than that of whites. Hispanics experience a serious gap in educational achievement at all educational levels as compared to whites. Contributing factors include family socioeconomic background, English language ability, and nativity, as well as the school system itself. The Ford Foundation has expanded its efforts to improve the condition of Hispanics by supporting efforts in community and economic development, research and policy analysis, social services, education, leadership development, and philanthropic activity by mainland funders based in Puerto Rico. (MM)

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Hispanics:
Challenges and Opportunities

A look at the demographic, economic, social, and political situation of Hispanics in the United States today, and at the Ford Foundation's initiatives to address the needs and impact of this growing population.

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Hispanics: Challenges and Opportunities

A working paper from the Ford Foundation

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435 June 1984

Preface

The Ford Foundation's interest in the Hispanic population of the United States is well established. Since the 1960s, Hispanics have been among those served by a variety of Foundation initiatives aimed at expanding opportunities and improving conditions for the disadvantaged. Support for Hispanics has included grants for Hispanic community development efforts, civil rights organizations, voter registration and education projects, teen pregnancy projects, infant and child nutrition and cognitive development programs, and educational institutions. Hispanics have also benefited from similar Foundation efforts not specifically directed to Hispanic organizations but that serve Hispanics among their target populations.

Recently, in response to the rapid expansion of the Hispanic population in the United States and its growing impact on American society, the Foundation's trustees encouraged the staff to explore whether a new Foundation initiative on the Hispanic population was desirable and, if so, what form such an initiative might take. The results of the exploration are presented in this report. Written by William A. Diaz, a program officer in governance and public policy, the report first describes the various groups that comprise the country's Hispanic population and then examines a number of issues and challenges facing those groups and the nation as a whole. After reviewing past and current Foundation efforts to help address those issues and meet those challenges, the paper presents a new Hispanic-focused Foundation program. The new program covers research and policy analysis, efforts to increase Hispanic participation in public affairs, and the need for greater public information and awareness about the Hispanic population among non-Hispanics. Also discussed is the possible creation of a new mechanism that would encourage increased philanthropic activity in Puerto Rico.

While we plan to broaden significantly our efforts on behalf of Hispanics in the United States, the Foundation's resources for work in this field are still limited. We therefore hope that this report will encourage other funders, as well as other institutions and individuals, to join us in these efforts. We also hope the report will prove useful in fostering understanding of that population, the challenges it faces, and the opportunities it represents.

Susan V. Berresford
Vice-President
U.S. and International Affairs Programs

Introduction

The growing Hispanic population of the United States is a source of controversy and, at times, of apprehension among non-Hispanics. To some, that population represents a kind of demographic "fifth column" threatening to rend the nation's social fabric through its apparent unwillingness to assimilate; to deprive other minorities and displaced blue-collar workers of jobs by accepting work at low and substandard wages; and to act as a monolithic and powerful special-interest group on such issues as immigration and bilingual education. Some feel, in short, that Hispanics are recent arrivals on the North American scene who are now claiming more than their fair share of the American Dream.

The reality of the Hispanic population--and of the issues, problems, and opportunities it presents--is not so simple. While one out of three Hispanics is foreign-born, compared to one out of twenty in the general population, the history of Hispanic settlement in this country began before the arrival of the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock. Hispanics first settled in the New World during the early sixteenth century; by the seventeenth century Hispanic culture was firmly established in much of what are now Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and California. The Spanish-speaking cities of Santa Fe, El Paso, and St. Augustine predate the Jamestown colony.

It is often overlooked that the "the first wheels that turned on American soil were Spanish in origin"[1] and that most agricultural products brought by the English to North America had already been introduced by the Spanish. The cattle industry was developed by Spaniards and Mexicans; it was from Mexican "vaqueros" that the American cowboy learned his trade. The wealth of the New World owed much to a Spaniard, Bartolomé de Medina, whose discovery in 1557 of a process to separate silver from ore revolutionized the mining industry. The list of Hispanic contributions to American society, though rarely acknowledged, is long.

Today, the U.S. Hispanic population is young, growing, and highly urbanized. It is multiracial, containing blacks, browns, and whites. Its attachment to the Spanish language and Hispanic culture is strong. Far from being monolithic, it is composed of distinct Spanish-origin groups, each of them concentrated in a different region of the country. While tied together by a common cultural background, language, and religion, these groups present distinct social and economic profiles. In the years ahead, they will have an increasing impact on many cities and states--on their politics, their public services, and their social and civic life.

Nevertheless, Hispanics form a seriously disadvantaged population. A few examples will suffice. In 1981, median family income for Hispanics was $16,401, lower than the $23,517 of white families but higher than black family income of $13,266. In 1982, nearly 30 percent of Hispanic families lived in poverty, two-and-a-half times the rate for whites. The average unemployment rate for Hispanics in 1983 was 13.8 percent, compared to 8.4 percent for whites and 19.5 percent for blacks. (For census purposes, "persons of Spanish origin," as a multiracial population, are also included in the black and white population groups.) Low rates of educational attainment are also a cause for concern. Though Hispanics' educational attainment has generally increased over the past decade, dropout rates remain high. One recent census estimate put the percentage of Hispanics eighteen and nineteen years old who were neither high school enrollees nor graduates at 37 percent, compared to 16 percent for whites and 19 percent for blacks.[2] Hispanics, and particularly Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, have also suffered discrimination that has serious consequences for their economic and educational well-being and has alienated many from mainstream society.

To help address these needs, additional problems must be overcome. Policy-relevant knowledge of the Hispanic population is largely undeveloped. Low political participation rates,

gerrymandering, and other factors have left Hispanics underrepresented as elected and appointed officials at the local, state, and federal levels. Most organizations that can advocate for and serve the Hispanic population are young and fragile, having come into existence only within the past fifteen or twenty years. Their funding, like that of other community-affiliated organizations, has been precarious; nor is the federal support on which many of these organizations have often depended any longer assured. In addition, recent federal cutbacks have reduced opportunities for leadership development for young Hispanics. Access to influential positions in the private sector has similarly been lacking. Finally, Hispanics until recently have been an "invisible" minority largely unaffected by affirmative action.

The work of the Ford Foundation has for several years included efforts on behalf of the Hispanic population of the United States. Recently, in response to the growing significance of the U.S. Hispanic population, Foundation staff have been engaged in a review of these efforts and have identified a number of new initiatives. Before turning to these initiatives, this paper provides an overview of the various Hispanic population groups, then examines current issues related to the population's growth and impact, its disadvantaged-minority status, questions of culture, language, and assimilation, resultant social and political strains, and problems of political participation, advocacy, and leadership. After a review of current Foundation activities regarding Hispanics and a brief look at the activities of other funders, the paper describes the increased activity planned by the Foundation in the areas of research and policy analysis, Hispanic participation in public affairs, public information and awareness about Hispanics, as well as the possibility of establishing a new funding mechanism for philanthropic work in Puerto Rico.

The Hispanic Population: An Overview

Hispanic Diversity

The U.S. Bureau of the Census regards as persons of Spanish origin or descent those who designate themselves in the census as being Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or Other Spanish/Hispanic. It is this "self-identifier" that now officially defines the Spanish-origin population known as Hispanic or Latino. In 1980, the census counted 14.6 million Hispanics on the U.S. mainland, 6.4 percent of the total population. This includes an estimated 1.3 million undocumented Hispanic aliens, 930,000 of whom are from Mexico;[3] it does not include the 3.1 million Puerto Ricans living in Puerto Rico. An additional but unknown number of Hispanics, both documented and undocumented, add to the "true" population, which has been estimated at roughly 20 million.

As shown by the pie chart below, the 14.6 million mainland Hispanics counted are mostly of Mexican origin, followed, in

Distribution of Spanish-origin Population in the United States, by Source of Origin: 1980



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1981. "Persons of Spanish Origin by State: 1980." Supplementary Report, PC80-81-7.

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descending order, by Other Hispanics, including Central and South Americans and others, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. If Puerto Rican islanders were included, the proportion of Puerto Ricans would increase to 29 percent and reduce the percentage of other groups proportionately.

Each of these groups has its own immigration and settlement history, its own current demographics and socioeconomic status, its own perceptions of itself and of its place in U.S. society, and its own internal diversity. A brief history of the various Hispanic groups in the United States is thus an essential backdrop to the remainder of this paper.

Mexican Americans. The history of Mexican Americans in the United States, until recently, has largely been one of dispossession, subjugation, and economic exploitation. More than 250 years before the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, by which Mexico ceded the northern half of its territory to the United States, Spaniards and later Mexicans settled the area that is today the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and California.[4] Mexico had first opened its northern region, now Texas, to settlers in 1819, requiring their allegiance to Mexico and their adoption of Catholicism. Feelings of racial superiority, the press of new immigrants, Mexico's abolition of slavery, and other factors led these settlers to revolt and create the Texas Republic in 1836, paving the way to further expansion of U.S. territory through the Mexican-American War of 1846-48. For the Mexican population that remained in this territory, it was the southwestward movement of the border and not their movement across it that brought them into the United States. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, their land and civil rights were to be protected, as was their right to retain their language, religion, and cultural practices.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the American Southwest was physically, culturally, and economically isolated from the rest of the United States. Before 1880, there

was little population movement between Mexico and the United States beyond local movements along an ill-defined border. Between 1880 and 1910, however, the southwestern United States experienced rapid economic development encouraged by the subjugation of the region's Native American tribes, the arrival of the railroads, and the commercialization of agriculture. During this period, Mexican workers were eagerly sought by U.S. mining, railroad, and agricultural interests.[5] This demand for labor, along with social, political, and economic disruptions in Mexico, increased the population of Mexicans in the U.S. to more than one million persons by 1930. At the same time, Americans of European heritage flocked to the West, resulting in large-scale violation of the land-grant protections accorded to Mexican Americans and their subsequent economic and social subordination. Soon, long-settled Mexican Americans were all but indistinguishable from new, economically deprived arrivals from Mexico.

The Great Depression, which brought economic stagnation to the Southwest, caused a backlash against unskilled immigrant labor that led to the deportation to Mexico, between 1929 and 1935, of more than 400,000 workers (including many born in the United States).[6] The pendulum swung back, however, when World War II created labor shortages in the Southwest. Thus, in 1942, a series of intergovernmental agreements between the U.S. and Mexico created the bracero program that allowed the importation of Mexican workers for periods of up to six months. Workers were to be paid the prevailing wages and, on paper, to be protected against discrimination. As a result, large numbers of temporary agricultural workers were transported north. Growers benefited from the continuing supply of seasonal helpers who came without families and left when the work was done. Agricultural interests also used braceros as strike breakers.[7]

The bracero program was originally conceived as a temporary wartime measure. U.S. agricultural interests secured its

extension and expansion until 1964, when, under pressure from organized labor, it was terminated by Congress. While the program was in operation, more than four million workers were recruited, and, at its height, braceros entered the United States at an annual rate of more than 400,000.[8] Also during the program, the Immigration and Naturalization Service made periodic efforts to crack down on undocumented aliens; the largest such effort, "Operation Wetback," resulted in one million expulsions in 1954--including, through indiscriminate enforcement practices, some U.S. citizens.[9] But the bracero program served to revive the traditional pattern of population movement across the U.S.-Mexican border.

In addition to labor shortages, World War II created a new consciousness among many returning Hispanic war veterans. They became less docile and more politically active in the face of discrimination. For Mexican Americans, such new organizations as the G.I. Forum and the Community Service Organization arose and gave rise to new and more capable political leadership. The black protest movement of the sixties also inspired a generation of Mexican Americans to undertake political action and helped to heighten a growing sense of group consciousness.

Legal migration from Mexico was checked by amendments to the U.S. immigration law in 1965, 1976, and 1978. Family reunification provisions, however, allowed many former braceros who had adjusted their status prior to the program's termination to obtain permanent resident status for their immediate families. In this way, the law encouraged immigration as a self-sustaining phenomenon.[10] Illegal immigration also grew rapidly. The 8.7 million persons of Mexican origin counted by the U.S. Census in 1980 is a conservative figure that includes some but not all undocumented aliens.

The Mexican-origin population thus is multigenerational, containing newcomers, both legal and undocumented, as well as families with a long history in the United States. In 1970,

16 percent of the population were foreign-born, 34 percent were second-generation, and 50 percent were third-generation or more, implying a broad range of social and economic diversity. Most of these individuals are descended from, or are themselves, unskilled immigrants drawn here to work in the low-wage sectors of the southwestern economy.[11]

Puerto Ricans. All Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens by birth, making them unique among Hispanic subgroups. The population is further characterized by a pattern of circular migration that was encouraged, until recently, by cheap airfares. This ease of access has an often adverse impact on Puerto Ricans' socioeconomic status, as it militates against their establishing a firm foothold in either the mainland or the island economy and contributes to other problems of adjustment.

The political status of Puerto Rico is a volatile issue among those who favor commonwealth status, statehood, or total independence. It is an issue that dominates Puerto Rican politics--on the island and the mainland. From 1898, at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, to 1952, Puerto Rico was a territory of the United States. In 1952, it became an estado libre asociado, or commonwealth, which allows the island a measure of self-government while it remains part of the United States. Despite the fact that the new arrangement provided Puerto Ricans with a greater measure of self-government, many of the vestiges of colonialism that were present prior to the compact remain. For example, Puerto Ricans have no voting representation in Congress and cannot vote in U.S. presidential elections. However, the president can order Puerto Ricans into battle, as occurred in the Korean conflict, where one out of every forty-two Americans killed was a Puerto Rican. These and similar facts are cited by proponents of both statehood and independence. Supporters of commonwealth status recognize the shortcomings of the present

situation but believe that they can be ameliorated gradually within the commonwealth framework.

It should also be noted that island residents do not pay federal income taxes, which permits the island to offer major tax advantages to qualifying firms. That allowed the famed Operation Bootstrap to attract new business into Puerto Rico and transform the island from a primarily agricultural society to an industrial one.

Although Puerto Ricans have lived in the continental United States for a century or more, their numbers prior to World War II were small. Affordable air travel and increased employment opportunities on the mainland in the postwar years altered the situation. The 1940 census counted only 70,000 persons of Puerto Rican extraction living on the U.S. mainland; by 1950 the number had increased to more than 300,000 and by 1960 to nearly 900,000. The 1970 census counted 1.4 million persons of Puerto Rican origin on the U.S. mainland and the 1980 census, some two million. While data on the migration of Puerto Ricans between the mainland and the island are limited, crude estimates from airline passenger statistics suggest a decrease in Puerto Rican migration to the mainland from the 1960s to the 1970s, some of the net loss due to reverse migration occurring during the recession years 1970, 1971, and 1976. Indeed, the ebb and flow of Puerto Rican migration appears to depend to a great extent on the relative strengths of the mainland and island economies.[12]

The history of Puerto Rican migration to the United States is similar to that of Mexican Americans in a number of respects. Both flows included large numbers of unskilled laborers seeking work in the low-wage sector of the U.S. economy.[13] Like Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans on the mainland are highly concentrated regionally; until recently, their migration has been directed primarily to New York City and its surrounding areas. Both groups have been victims of discrimination and prejudice. Reflecting the lateness of their large-scale arrival on the mainland, however,

Puerto Ricans did not organize there in significant numbers until the late fifties, well behind the Mexican American community in that respect. Another difference is that Puerto Ricans have always been concentrated primarily in central cities like New York, where their employment outlook has depended on the strength of the local manufacturing and service sectors.[14] Their low wages in the secondary labor market of those sectors, the decline of manufacturing jobs in the Northeast, and the high cost of urban living have contributed much to the status of Puerto Ricans as the poorest of U.S. Hispanic groups.

Cubans. Cubans, who in 1980 comprised about 6 percent of the Spanish-origin population, are the third largest Hispanic group in the United States and the most prosperous. Although the first major Cuban migration to the United States occurred in 1868, in response to the demand for labor of the new tobacco industry of Key West, most Cuban immigration is a product of the past twenty years. In 1950, there were only about 34,000 persons of Cuban birth in the United States. The advent of the Castro regime in January 1959 brought to the U.S. many wealthy and middle-class Cubans, the first wave of an exodus that brought the number of Cuban-origin persons counted in the census to 125,000 by 1960, to half a million by 1970, and to 803,000 by 1980.[15]

In addition to the financial, educational, and cultural assets of many Cubans refugees, the support of private charitable organizations and the federally funded Cuban Refugee Program of the early sixties contributed much to the success of the Cuban refugee community. A principal aim of the program was to relocate the refugees in communities across the United States in order to relieve the strain that the Cuban influx was assumed to have placed on the depressed economy of Miami. By the early seventies, however, a significant return migration to Miami had taken place, largely a result of the thriving economy of the city's Hispanic

community. Today, some 60 percent of all Cubans in the United States live in the Miami area.

Unlike Mexicans, Cubans and Puerto Ricans show little generational diversity. In 1980, most Cubans were first- and second-generation.[16] This pattern was reinforced by the Mariel boatlift of May 1980, in which 125,000 Cubans from lower socioeconomic backgrounds than those in earlier waves entered the United States. The arrival of this latter group, while increasing the Cuban presence in this country, has lowered the socioeconomic profile of the Cuban-origin population as whole. In addition, their arrival coincides with a period in which opportunities generally have been limited. The experience of these "late" arrivals is thus likely to be less favorable than that of those who came earlier.

Other Hispanics. "Other Hispanics" is a residual census category that covers Central and South Americans, including Spanish-origin Caribbeans--primarily Dominicans--and a group known as Hispanos. It is estimated that between 1950 and 1980, the number of persons from Central and South America enumerated by the census increased from 57,000 to well over a million. The large majority of U.S. Hispanics of Central and South American origin are foreign-born. In 1979, Central and South Americans comprised an estimated 8 percent of the U.S. Hispanic population.[17] Central and South Americans are a culturally heterogeneous group, concentrated in different regions of the United States according to national origin. Dominicans and Colombians are generally found in New York, for example, while Guatemalans and Salvadorans are found in Los Angeles. Though the Census Bureau provides figures on the number of Central and South Americans by nationality, little is known of the characteristics of this population by national origin.

Like Cubans, but unlike Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, the educational and occupational mix of Central and South Americans spans a wide socioeconomic spectrum. They are represented to a

greater extent than Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in the white- and blue-collar occupational categories, while their presence in farm work is negligible. Also like Cubans but unlike Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, many are political refugees and asylum seekers in flight from the violence of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Nicaragua. Some have come to the United States, either temporarily or permanently, for ecoromic reasons. While much is known about the status of other Hispanic groups, little is known about how the various Central and South American groups are faring in the United States.

"Hispanos," who reside primarily in the American Southwest, trace their origin to the original Spanish colonists or to subsequent immigration from the Iberian peninsula. Little is known about them, including their precise number. However, of the "Other Hispanics," more than two-thirds were native-born and of native-born parentage. It is this group that most likely represents the Hispanos. While they are most often found in the same states as are Mexican Americans, they are ethnically and culturally distinct. Other Hispanics include Spaniards such as Basques, Catalonians, and Spanish gypsies, as well as those who are partly Hispanic and who identify themselves as "Other Hispanic" in the census.

Problems and Issues

A Growing Population

One of the primary characteristics of the U.S. Hispanic population--and the one that has attracted the most attention in recent years--is its rapid growth. The 1980 census figure of 14.6 million Hispanics living on the mainland represents an increase of 61 percent from 1970, when fewer than 9.1 million Hispanics were counted. By comparison, the total United States population grew by 11 percent in the same period, from 203 million in 1970 to 226 million in 1980.

Part of the population's rapid growth is attributable to high fertility: Hispanics are a young population, with a median age in 1980 of twenty-three compared to thirty-one for the non-Hispanic population. As shown in Table 1, on page 18, the fertility rate in 1980 of Hispanic-origin women fifteen to forty-four years old was 95.4 per 1,000--about one child for every ten women--approximately 32 points higher than the rate for white women (62.4) and 5 points above the rate for black women (90.7). Of the Spanish-origin groups, Mexican American women had the highest fertility rate, 111.3 per 1,000. Mexican American females can be expected to average close to three births each, compared to 2.4 births for blacks and 1.7 for whites.[18] Along with immigration data, this suggests that Mexican Americans will be the fastest-growing segment of the Hispanic population in the years ahead.

The Hispanic population's growth may also be attributed in part to high rates of both legal and undocumented immigration. The United States will probably experience high rates of both kinds for the foreseeable future. Though the numbers are unreliable, total undocumented immigration to the United States is generally estimated to account for an annual net inflow of half a million aliens, the majority of whom are from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America. The growth of this flow is

Table 1

BIRTH RATES AND FERTILITY RATES: 22 REPORTING STATES, 1980

Ethnic group	Births per 1,000 population	Births per 1,000 women aged 15-44
All origins	16.4	70.2
White	14.2	62.4
Black	22.9	90.7
All Hispanic	23.5	95.4
Mexican American	26.6	111.3
Puerto Rican	20.3	77.0
Cuban	9.6	41.9
Other Hispanic	20.0	75.3

Source: Stephanie J. Ventura, "Births of Hispanic Parentage, 1980." Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 32, No. 6, Supplement, Washington, D.C.: National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, September 1983.

reflected in the ever-increasing number of apprehensions of illegal entrants along the 1,900-mile U.S.-Mexican border--more than a million apprehensions in 1983 alone (a number somewhat inflated by "repeaters" and "day visitors" and increased by the improved enforcement of border restrictions in recent years). Twenty years ago the number was closer to 100,000.

Several factors are commonly cited to explain this phenomenon. Most important is the demographic and economic situation in Mexico. The Mexican population is growing rapidly, and while its rate of growth is declining, it is expected to rise from the present 73 million to 100 million by the end of the century. The Mexican economy is not generating enough jobs to absorb such an increase. Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico have traditionally been great and were widened further by the devaluation of the peso in 1982. The pressure on Mexican workers to seek work and dollars in the United States is thus greater than ever--and growing. The unstable political situation and human rights violations in Central America and ethnic and family ties linking Mexican and U.S. communities also help foster some, and perhaps much, movement.

In addition to fertility and immigration, some of the growth of the Hispanic community may be "phantom growth" accounted for by better methods for enumerating Hispanics by the Census Bureau in 1980 compared to 1970.[19] On the other hand, some have suggested that the 1980 census undercounted Hispanics and other minorities, as has been suggested in the past. The two positions are not contradictory. There have probably always been more Hispanics in the U.S. than counted by the census. However, the enumeration of Hispanics was substantially improved in 1980.

The high growth rate of the nation's Hispanic population has led some to suggest that it may surpass blacks--enumerated at 25.5 million in 1980--as the country's largest minority group in the coming decade. Given the deficiencies of census data, such projections should be viewed with reservation. There is, however,

little doubt that the Hispanic population will continue to grow rapidly as a result of high fertility and high rates of immigration and slowly approach the black population in size in the next fifteen years.

A Young Population. Hispanics are younger as a group than blacks, whose median age is twenty-five. Almost one-third of the Hispanic population is under the age of fifteen, compared to about one-fifth of the general population. Only 4.9 percent are sixty-five or older, compared to 11.3 percent of the general population.[20] Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans, with a median age of about twenty-two, constitute the youngest Hispanic groups, and Cubans, with a median age of thirty-eight, the eldest. Because many Hispanic women are now entering their childbearing years, and because Hispanic women tend to bear more children and at younger ages than others, the Hispanic population will be young for some time, while the rest of the U.S. population will continue to age.

One consequence will be in the area of public policy. For example, there has been and will continue to be growth in the Hispanic school-age population in places where Hispanics are geographically concentrated. For this reason, Hispanics will continue to be particularly concerned about educational policies, while the attention of other population subgroups may increasingly turn to other service issues, particularly those concerning the elderly. Youth unemployment has affected and will continue disproportionately to affect Hispanics and blacks, who represent a growing share of the country's otherwise shrinking teenage population. Important social, economic, and political consequences may also follow from the fact that as more whites reach Social Security age, their support will depend on Social Security taxes paid by an increasingly Hispanic and black workforce.

Geographic Distribution. While persons of Hispanic origin reside in every state of the union, five states--California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois--contain almost three-quarters of all Hispanics in the United States, and the first three of these states account for 63 percent of the population (see Table 2, on page 22). These data, however, do not fully reflect the geographic and urban concentration of the Hispanic population. Contrary to the popular stereotype, Hispanics are highly urbanized: 83 percent live in metropolitan areas, versus 77 percent of non-Hispanic blacks and 66 percent of whites. Close to half of all Hispanics (48 percent) live within ten metropolitan areas; Los Angeles contains more than two million Hispanics, and New York 1.5 million. California and Texas, plus the metropolitan areas of New York, Miami, and Chicago, account for 70 percent of the Hispanic population. The economic and labor-market conditions of these areas to a large extent determine the socioeconomic position of the Hispanic population. Although, as noted earlier, this geographic distribution is reinforced by distribution according to country of origin, such cities as Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles are home to an increasingly heterogeneous Hispanic group.

A Population In Need

The U.S. Hispanic population suffers from a variety of economic and social problems ranging from unemployment and underemployment to poor housing and inadequate health care. The status of Hispanics in three basic areas--income, employment, and education--provides a clear picture of their current position on the socioeconomic ladder.

Income and Employment. Official statistics on the Spanish-origin population show that its economic position relative to the general population is, and has always been, markedly low. In 1982, for example, median American family income was $23,430, while the

Table 2

TOP NINE STATES IN HISPANIC POPULATION: 1980

(States with 250,000 or more Hispanics)

State	Rank	Number of Hispanics	Percent distribution
United States, total	--	14,608,673	100.0
California	1	4,544,331	31.1
Texas	2	2,985,824	20.4
New York	3	1,659,300	11.4
Florida	4	858,158	5.9
Illinois	5	635,602	4.4
New Jersey	6	491,883	3.4
New Mexico	7	477,222	3.3
Arizona	8	440,701	3.0
Colorado	9	339,717	2.3
Total in nine top states		12,432,738	85.1

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Persons of Spanish Origin by State: 1980." 1980 Census of Population, Supplementary Report PC80-S1-7. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982.

median Hispanic family income was $16,230. Hispanics as a group fall between whites and blacks on measures of income, although Puerto Ricans fare worse than blacks. Moreover, the position of Hispanics over the past decade has not improved relative to whites, a situation that is true for the black population as well (see Table 3, on page 24).

Hispanic families are more than twice as likely as non-Hispanic white families to fall below the official poverty line of $9,866 for a family of four: 30 percent versus 12 percent. (The percentage for blacks is 36 percent.)[21] Puerto Ricans fare especially poorly. In 1978, the proportion of Puerto Rican families living in poverty was almost 40 percent, more than five-and-a-half times the white rate of 6.9 percent.[22] Contributing to the poverty problem of Puerto Ricans was a sharp increase in the number of female-headed, single-parent households, greater than that among blacks. Between 1960 and 1979, this proportion rose from 15 percent--a level comparable to that of other Hispanic groups--to 41 percent.

Closely related to Hispanic income is the employment status of Hispanic groups. As a general rule, Hispanic unemployment is about 60 percent higher than that of whites, while black unemployment is more than 100 percent higher. In 1983, the unemployment rate for whites was 8.4 percent, for blacks 19.5 percent, and for Hispanics 13.8 percent (see Table 4, on page 25). Teenage unemployment follows a similar pattern but at higher levels. This can be seen in the employment-to-population ratios for sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds shown in Table 4. The employment-to-population ratio is precisely that, and does not discriminate between those in the population looking for work and those not looking--which distinguishes it from the employment rate: close to half of white teenagers, one-third of Hispanic teenagers, and about one-fifth of black teenagers were employed in any given month in 1983. Puerto Rican men and women experience especially severe employment problems. Looking at their

Table 3

MEDIAN INCOME OF HISPANIC, BLACK, AND WHITE FAMILIES: 1972-1982

Year	Median family income (in constant 1982 dollars)			Hispanic family income as percent of white income
	Hispanic	Black	White	
1972	$17,790	$14,922	$25,107	71
1973	17,836	14,877	25,777	69
1974	17,594	14,765	24,110	71
1975	16,140	14,835	24,110	67
1976	16,390	14,766	24,823	66
1977	17,141	14,352	25,124	68
1978	17,518	15,166	25,606	68
1979	19,255	14,[illegible]00	25,689	71
1980	[illegible]6,242	13,[illegible]	24,176	67
1981	[illegible]6,461	13,[illegible]	23,517	70
1982	[illegible]6,287	13,591	24,603	66

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1981" (Advance Data from the March 1982 Current Population Survey)," Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 134, July 1982, Table 3. U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1982," Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 140, 1983, Table 2.

Table 4

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THOSE 16 YEARS OLD AND OLDER

BY RACE AND SPANISH ORIGIN: 1983 ANNUAL AVERAGES

Employment Status (numbers in thousands)	Total All Workers	White	Black	Total Spanish Origin[2]	Mexican Origin	Puerto Rican Origin	Cuban Origin
Total							
Civilian noninstitutional population	174,215	150,805	18,925	12,771	5,788	1,239	765
Civilian labor force	111,550	97,021	11,647	8,119	3,800	610	523
Participation rate (%)[1]	64.0	64.3	61.5	63.6	65.7	49.2	68.4
Employed	100,834	88,893	9,375	6,995	3,242	512	461
Employment-population ratio (%)[3]	57.9	58.9	49.5	54.8	56.0	41.3	60.3
Unemployed	10,717	8,128	2,272	1,124	558	97	62
Unemployment rate (%)	9.6	8.4	19.5	13.8	14.7	15.9	11.9
Both Sexes, 16-19 Years							
Employment-population ratio (%)	41.5	45.9	18.7	32.5	35.2	14.5	48.5

1. Ratio of civilian labor force to civilian noninstitutional population.
2. Including Central and South Americans.
3. Ratio of those employed to civilian noninstitutional population.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 1984. Employment and Earnings, Vol 31, No. 1, pp. 200, 201. Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

employment-to-population ratio, only about 40 percent of all mainland Puerto Ricans older than sixteen are working, compared to half of the black population and close to 60 percent of the white population. Puerto Rican teenagers (youths sixteen to nineteen years old) also have a lower employment-to-population ratio than black teenagers. More than one-third of Puerto Rican families sampled in 1979 reported no workers, compared to only 9 percent of Mexican families, a fact that helps explain the difference in poverty rates and family income between the two groups.

Hispanics are also underemployed. Compared to white males, they are more likely to be intermittently employed, to accept part-time work when they would prefer to work full-time, and to hold marginal jobs[23] or jobs in the lower levels of both blue-collar and white-collar employment. Contrary to the popular stereotype, agriculture is not an important source of employment for Hispanics as a group; it accounts for only 7 percent of employment among Mexicans, and close to nothing for other Hispanic groups.[24]

The reasons why Hispanics do poorly in the labor market are not entirely clear. Because characteristics such as educational attainment are easy to measure and intuitively appealing in explaining labor market success, they have been emphasized in discussions of Hispanic labor-market experience. Studies in this vein have generally ignored the possible impact of labor markets themselves, as well as business employment practices and other institutional and contextual factors. Not surprisingly, given the limited analyses available, researchers disagree on the relative importance of various influences.

Greater educational attainment and higher levels of English proficiency certainly do help to determine employment outcomes. Of the two, it has been suggested that English proficiency, for Hispanics, is the more important and has the greatest "pay-off."[25] For example, Hispanic dropouts may find it more useful to become English-proficient than to complete high school

or obtain an equivalency degree. Nativity also appears to play an important role in occupational outcomes. Hispanics born on the U.S. mainland do better than those born elsewhere. This suggests that some improvement can be expected in second and subsequent generations, especially when combined with greater English proficiency. Though its precise effects are difficult to determine, Hispanics, like blacks, are also known to experience a significant degree of job discrimination. Even when the business cycle, age, education, region, type of industry, and language ability are taken into account, gaps on various measures of labor market success between Hispanics and whites still persist, as they do for blacks. Disparities between Hispanics and whites can be reduced by greater education or a general improvement in the economy, but will not be eliminated by these alone. Some economists also attribute the poor showing of Hispanics to their disproportionate concentration in the so-called secondary labor market, characterized by low wages, limited potential for advancement, and high turnover.

Differences in the employment picture for various Hispanic groups can also be partially accounted for by regional employment factors. For example, in New York, 250,000 jobs were lost in operative, service, clerical, and craft work during the seventies, contributing to the unemployment problems of Puerto Ricans living in the New York area. By contrast, California and Texas gained 1.4 and 1.1 million jobs, respectively, in these categories, creating more employment opportunities for the Mexican Americans who live in those states.

In this as in other respects, the Cuban population of Florida is unique. Their geographic concentration appears to have worked to their advantage. The existence of a Spanish-speaking Cuban economic enclave in Miami, which has become an economic "gateway" between the U.S. and Latin America, has offset the potential employment problems of substantial numbers of Cuban immigrants with English-language deficiencies. Cubans born in

Cuba may do better than those born here, given their relatively high original socioeconomic status. Again, these findings do not include the Mariel refugees, a substantial number of whom seem to be experiencing severe joblessness and other economic problems.

Education. It is in education that the gap in achievement between Hispanics and other groups, extending from preschool levels through graduate training, is the widest and most serious. Census data show the education gap in stark terms: in 1981, at a time when employers were demanding more scholastic credentials, 36 percent of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old Hispanics were high school dropouts, more than double the national figure (see Table 5, on page 29). School achievement, though slowly improving, is a serious problem for all Hispanics but most troublesome for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. The 1976 Survey of Income and Education shows that while whites had the highest level of educational attainment, averaging close to twelve years, Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans averaged about 2.6 years less, while Cubans and Latin Americans trailed by about one year less.[26]

Hispanics also experience high rates of grade-level advancement problems and of school dropout. The problems of Hispanic teenagers are especially severe. While fewer than one out of ten white students fourteen to twenty years old were two years or more behind their classmates, one out of four students of Mexican and Puerto Rican origin lagged this far behind others of their age group.[27] Students who must repeat grades become bored with materials designed for younger students, fall behind their peers, and are stigmatized as slow learners--all of which may make dropping out seem an attractive alternative.

The educational disadvantage of Hispanics at the elementary and secondary level, particularly the small number of Hispanic high school graduates in proportion to the general population, results in significantly lower representation in institutions of postsecondary education. In 1981 more than 26 percent of whites,

Table 5

SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND DROPOUT RATES FOR THE POPULATION 16 TO 34 YEARS OF AGE

BY RACE AND SPANISH ORIGIN: 1981

Age	All Races		White		Black		Spanish Origin	
	Enrollment Rates (%)	Not Enrolled and Not HS Graduate (%)	Enrollment Rates (%)	Not Enrolled and Not HS Graduate (%)	Enrollment Rates (%)	Not Enrolled and Not HS Graduate (%)	Enrollment Rates (%)	Not Enrolled and Not HS Graduate (%)
Total 3-34	48.9	12.8	48.9	12.3	52.5	16	49.0	28.6
16-17	90.6	7.8	90.4	7.8	91.3	8.0	82.8	15.8
18-19	49.0	16.0	48.5	15.5	48.2	19.3	37.8	36.4
20-21	31.6	15.8	32.6	14.6	23.4	23.3	20.6	36.2
22-24	16.5	15.2	16.2	14.2	14.7	22.4	12.3	42.1
25-29	9.0	13.8	8.5	12.9	9.9	20.5	8.3	41.7
30-34	6.9	13.9	6.7	13.0	7.2	21.2	5.0	47.1

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1983. School Enrollment - Social and Economic Characteristics of Students, October 1981. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 373, pp. 8-9. Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

20 percent of blacks, and 17 percent of Hispanics eighteen to twenty-four years old were enrolled in college.[28] Hispanic students who complete high school, however, enter college at about the same rate as do whites. Though high school completion and college attendance are on the rise, very few Hispanics manage to complete baccalaureate programs within the traditional four-year period. In addition, Hispanics are nearly twice as likely as whites to attend two-year colleges, and half as likely to attend universities.[29] A longitudinal study of the high school class of 1972 indicates that Hispanics also experience both higher attrition rates and lower rates of transfer from two-year to four-year colleges than other groups.

The reasons why Hispanics do poorly in school are less certain than are explanations of their employment experience. The absence of consistent data on Hispanics concerning language usage, the quality of the schools they attend, the quality and quantity of programs to teach English to Spanish-speakers, and differences in the experiences of different Hispanic groups preclude drawing conclusions with certainty. Moreover, as with employment, explanatory models have generally focused on students' characteristics in determining achievement. Nevertheless, several possible factors have been linked, some more strongly than others, to the school achievement of Hispanics.

Family socioeconomic background, English language ability, and nativity seem to be important factors. Families with higher incomes and where parents are more highly educated generally produce children who themselves will do better educationally than their less advantaged counterparts. Knowledge of English increases the rates of high school completion and college entrance. Hispanics who are English-monolingual, according to one study, approximate the high-school-degree completion rate of whites.[30] Hispanic youths born on the U.S. mainland do better than those born elsewhere (with the possible exception of those born elsewhere who enter U.S. schools at an early age). Here

again, Cubans are the exception. Foreign-born Cubans do better than U.S.-born Cubans (and even native-born whites), either because those who came in early waves were highly educated or because, as latecomers, their children are younger, have not completed schooling, and thus lower the native-born average.

While researchers have had difficulty establishing the independent impact of schools on educational achievement, observers also believe that school quality, discrimination by school professionals against Hispanics, and teachers' self-fulfilling prophecies of low achievement for Hispanics have historically played a role in "pushing" Hispanics out of school. Mexican Americans in the Southwest have long been discriminated against in the public school systems. They have been segregated from non-Mexican-origin children and punished for using Spanish even in casual conversation. They have attended schools that are poorly staffed and equipped. Puerto Rican youths may not have faced the same level of discrimination in the New York City school system but they have nonetheless often found their schools to be overcrowded, poorly equipped, and generally unprepared to handle the sudden infusion of culturally distinct children who entered the system in the fifties, sixties, and seventies. Finally, a recent study shows that while school segregation has generally decreased for black students in all areas of the country with the exception of the Northeast, the segregation of Hispanic students is on the rise from already high levels.[31] The implications of this phenomenon are not yet clear but it may have serious social consequences.

It is within the context of comparatively low levels of school achievement for Hispanic children that the issue of bilingual education can best be understood. It is important to say at the outset that probably few issues in recent memory have generated more heat and less light than the current debate on this topic. Nor is one issue more misunderstood. To help clarify the

issue, it is probably best to separate it into three dimensions: the legal-political, the pedagogical, and the cultural.

Legally, the issue finds its roots in complaints to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) asserting that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting recipients of federal aid from discriminating against racial groups, was being violated by school districts on the Texas border in their treatment of Mexican-origin children. Review teams from OCR confirmed that, as alleged, Spanish-speaking children were being held back from grade promotion because of their lack of English-language ability though no English-language instruction programs were available to them. The teams found other abuses as well. For example, it appeared to be an unwritten rule in some school districts that Mexicans didn't go to high school and that Mexican-origin teachers were paid lower salaries than those non-Mexican whites received.

In response to the original complaint, OCR in May 1970 issued a memorandum to all school districts with an enrollment of more than 5 percent national-origin-minority children that required "affirmative steps" to rectify the language deficiencies of those unable to speak or understand English. In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the department's position in Lau v. Nichols, affirming that schools must provide compensatory education for those who were not native speakers of English to be in compliance with the Civil Rights Act. The court, however, did not specify a particular kind of remedy. In the summer of 1976, OCR issued what became known as the "Lau remedies." They required school districts to adopt transitional bilingual education (TBE) programs at the elementary and intermediate school levels that provided for the teaching of content courses (such as math and science) in the student's native language while he or she learned English-language skills. Greater flexibility was allowed at the secondary-school level. The Lau remedies, never published in the Federal Register, remained unofficial. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, they

took on the force of law and were used by OCR staff in arriving at compliance agreements with more than 400 school districts. While some districts chafed under their restrictions, others found them to be a "safe harbor" for achieving compliance with the law. Bilingual education received further impetus in the Northeast under the "Aspira Consent Decree," which required the New York City Board of Education to implement a program of bilingual education under the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

In August 1980, the Lau remedies were issued in the Federal Register as a notice of proposed rule-making. It being a presidential election year, they generated much controversy, a good part of which concerned issues of federal intrusiveness into local school affairs. In the wake of the 1980 presidential election, the proposed regulations were withdrawn and the Department of Education (DOEd) retreated to the "May 25 Memorandum" of 1970, as it had come to be called. This meant that DOEd required affirmative action, but emphasized that the Lau decision did not require or authorize OCR to favor one remedy--transitional bilingual education--over another. This is where OCR policy stands today, though more than 400 compliance agreements specifying transitional bilingual education as a remedy remain in effect.

On a somewhat separate and more political track, bilingual education traces its roots to political pressure brought to bear by Mexican Americans on Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas. They urged the senator to introduce and support the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, which became Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Support for the act among Mexican American educators and others grew out of the kinds of issues that led to the OCR compliance reviews, especially the very high dropout rates found among Mexican-origin students. The act established a competitive categorical grant program in the Department of Education for school districts wishing to support bilingual education programs to aid the education of low-income

children of "limited English speaking ability." The income requirement was later eliminated. Funding for Title VII grew from $7 million in 1969 to $150 million in 1980, and was subsequently reduced to $138 million in 1982. The program is up for reauthorization in 1984. Despite all the attention it received, Title VII covers no more than 16 percent of Hispanic youths and only a small fraction of Spanish-speaking Hispanics.[32] Less than half of Hispanic students who enter school speaking little or no English are served in Title VII programs.[33]

Pedagogically, bilingual education has become a "catch-all" phrase for several types of programs. This elastic use of the term adds confusion to the debate over the merits and desirability of specific bilingual programs. Four basic models fall under the bilingual rubric, each reflecting different sides of the debate or different theories. Variation exists in the implementation of these programs, and the models described below represent "ideal types" seldom found in pure form in schools. It is important to recognize that all these models implicitly accept the idea that English-speaking ability is critical to school completion and the ability to compete in American society.

1. Structured Immersion: In these programs, the teacher instructs in English and students respond either in English or their native tongue. The teacher always responds in English and special curricula are utilized that assume no prior English language. The teacher must be capable in both the native language and English. It is this kind of immersion program that received media attention in the wake of a report of an independent task force established by the Twentieth Century Fund on federal elementary and secondary education policy. It is important to note that this is not a "sink or swim" program; students are assisted throughout the process by bilingual teachers.

2. English as a Second Language (ESL): Content courses are taught in English for most of the day, and students receive separate English classes for part of the day.

3. Transitional Bilingual Education (TBE): Students are taught content in their mother tongue and are gradually brought into English instruction. Usually an ESL component

is attached. The key goal of transitional programs is for students not to fall behind in content and cognitive skills while learning English. It is TBE that the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights has, until recently, supported. However, the model of bilingual/bicultural maintenance (see below), which generates the most controversy, is also allowable under the department's guidelines and has been federally funded under Title VII.

4. Bilingual/Bicultural Maintenance: Programs of this type seek not only to develop English mastery but also to develop, maintain, and enhance students' speaking and writing ability in their native tongue, and to help maintain their native culture.

The major issues that have arisen over bilingual education are: Should government support it and if so, in what form? As to the first issue, there is little dispute in the current debate that some form of language instruction should be provided to non-English-speaking students. Virtually no one supports a return to a "sink or swim" policy whereby minority students are thrown into "majority" classes and expected to learn English on their own or fail. Though some claim that it was precisely this process that forced many immigrants to learn English, the truth is probably that many sank and only a few swam. (As one former chairman of the New York City Board of Education is fond of saying, "We used to graduate one student in ten. Now we graduate four. That's progress!") It is, moreover, historically incorrect. Germans in particular, but also Scandinavians and other early immigrant groups (those who came prior to 1880), were able to marshall support for the teaching of their native languages in both public and private schools. Only after 1880, when immigrants from Eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean began to arrive in large numbers, did the emphasis in schooling change to "Americanization" at all costs.

It is over the question of the form of bilingual education that the most controversy has been generated. Research has not been very helpful in resolving it. Though the available evidence suggests that students do, in fact, make the transition to

English-language instruction, there is no clear evidence that model 3, transitional bilingual education, the most popular approach, works to increase school retention. Some argue that in view of the lack of solid evidence of success among existing approaches, other approaches should be tried.

The lack of clear research results on TBE reflects, in part, methodological difficulties in evaluating such programs. To be carried out effectively, evaluation would require appropriate experimental controls over students' background variables, teacher quality, agreement on standard and validated tests for measuring language acquisition, and other controls that remain problematic, and the patience for an extended, longitudinal study. There are also the continuing problems of an insufficient number of qualified bilingual teachers, inadequate curricula, and insufficient attention to evaluation. Further, the argument is made that resources devoted to bilingual education have been so limited that programs can hardly be blamed for not working. In essence, it is impossible to say whether the absence of clear evidence on effectiveness is due to problems associated with research limitations, faulty implementation of the methodology, or to the concept itself. Yet as one proponent of bilingual education has put it, "Perhaps Hispanic minorities are so overwhelmingly in favor of bilingual education because the experiences with the past programs have been so negative that any alternative is a step in the right direction."[34]

The argument made for transitional bilingual education has a simple logic: students should not be penalized in their progress in school because they cannot speak English. Therefore content courses should be taught in the native language until competence in English is achieved. An additional argument is that it is important to school retention and success to reinforce students' positive self-image by allowing them to be able to learn in their own tongue while the transition to English is occurring. Finally, it is argued that the most effective way for non-English-speakers

to learn English is, first, to consolidate their native language skills and then make the transfer (just as it is easier to learn a foreign language once one has mastered the grammatical rules of English). It is conceded that the goal of bilingual education is not rapid movement into English, but effective transition. The answer from critics to this point is that bilingual classes segregate students from contact with English speakers, making the eventual transition harder.

However, the real "nut" in the bilingual controversy is language and cultural maintenance. Critics argue that model 3 and, in particular, model 4 (bilingual-bicultural) perpetuate a foreign culture and that this is not a legitimate or appropriate role for the public schools. Critics also charge that students competent in English are being assigned to bilingual programs for native language maintenance purposes or to inflate the need for the program. They also assert that bilingual education increases the segregation of Hispanic students from non-Hispanics. James Fallows, in a recent article in The Atlantic Monthly entitled "The New Immigrants," wrote: "The wars over bilingual education have had a bitter, symbolic quality. Each side has invested the issue with a meaning the other can barely comprehend. To most Mexican American parents and children, bilingual education is merely a way of learning English; to Hispanic activists, it is a symbol that they are at last taking their place in the sun. But to many Americans, it sounds like a threat not to assimilate."[35] Fallows also noted that "the more [he] saw of the classes, the more convinced [he] became that most of the students were learning English" and that the issue has become inflammatory precisely because of its symbolic quality.

But the cultural maintenance approach need be considered neither subversive nor a refusal by Hispanics to become part of the fabric of American society. As one bilingual proponent has stated:

> The education of children does not take place in a cultural vacuum. Each subject matter area introduced in the schools is saturated with culture both in the content of the material and in the methodology utilized. The cry for cultural pluralism in education is for materials and methodologies to be representative of the various cultures found in American society rather than unfairly representing solely the cultural characteristics of Northern Europeans.
>
> American Indians are sick of hearing that America was "discovered in 1492," with the assumption that other populations did not exist before that or that they were not worthy of mention. American blacks resent their status in history books as carefree darkies for 100 years, the cause of the American Civil War, and a problem ever since. Mexican-Americans take little pride in being the villains of the Alamo who murdered John Wayne, disappeared for 100 years, and have recently surfaced as the culturally disadvantaged.[36]

What Hispanic advocates also find paradoxical is that schools support the teaching of foreign languages but will not support Spanish language maintenance, particularly as it takes advantage of a natural resource in the country's Hispanic population that could be developed for commercial and diplomatic benefits.

The ultimate decision about whether the schools ought to aid in the maintenance of native language and culture is, in the end, a political and ideological one. There is probably no consensus, even among Hispanics, about the goal of cultural maintenance and language maintenance. Nor do Hispanics agree on whether the goal of bilingual education should be assimilation into American society if that means the loss of ethnic identity. But there is little doubt among Hispanics that English ought to be acquired.

The movement towards English by Hispanics, then, is inescapable. It is an implicit goal in any bilingual program, though as Fallows points out, with Mexico next door and Puerto Rico a short plane ride away, "Spanish will be a living language in the United States longer than any other alternative to English."[37]

Culture, Language, and Assimilation

The issue of bilingual education is part of a larger concern among non-Hispanics regarding Hispanic assimilation and the potentially harmful social effects if that assimilation does not occur. For most Hispanics, the issue is spurious. While most Hispanics appear to regard knowledge of English as a prerequisite to success in American society, many also want to retain their Spanish language and Hispanic culture. Moreover, many resent the pressure on them to assimilate--which they interpret to mean that they are not acceptable as they are.

The debate reflects the historic American tension between assimilation and pluralism--the "melting pot" versus the mosaic--and between ethnic identity and civic identity. Older models of assimilation assumed that the cultural cohesion (values, beliefs, norms, and attitudes) of ethnic groups in the United States would eventually break down through contact with individuals outside the group and through increasing economic and social mobility. Newer models stress that acculturation can occur independent of assimilation and integration into the mainstream, through the processes of mass culture--educational systems, religious systems, and the mass media. In this way, ethnic identity may be preserved through language, cultural expression, and ethnic ties, but values, beliefs, norms, and attitudes are those of the dominant culture.

A major study based on 1970 census data concluded that "with each passing decade [Hispanics] are being brought closer to the mainstream of social change and economic development of the larger society until eventually there will be a merging. . . . In another generation or two they will be almost indistinguishable from the general U.S. population."[38] The study used a number of measures for assimilation but focused on three primary ones: intermarriage with non-Hispanics, language use, and levels of fertility. It found that U.S.-born women of Hispanic parentage married non-Hispanic whites to varying degrees: wives of Mexican

descent at the rate of 16 percent, Puerto Rican descent 33 percent, and Cuban descent 46 percent; that about one-third of U.S.-born Hispanics switch from Spanish to English as the language spoken at home; and that fertility declines with succeeding generations and higher levels of education, gradually approaching levels for the U.S. population as a whole. A similar study of intermarriage in New York City suggested high rates of intermarriage in the second generation for Cubans, Central Americans, and South Americans, but not Puerto Ricans.[39] Based on these studies, it would appear that Hispanics are moving into the mainstream with succeeding generations.

Whether or not Hispanics are assimilating more or less quickly than other ethnic groups, they do seem to retain a sense of their original cultural identity more tenaciously than other ethnic groups have. The movement of Hispanics across the common border with Mexico, which has increased in recent years, and the migration and return of Puerto Ricans between the island and the mainland serve as a cultural reinforcement that did not exist for earlier immigrant groups. Family ties between "here" and "there" are easier to maintain, and travel back and forth is relatively simple. Moreover, the ongoing flow of new Hispanic immigrants means that the assimilation or adjustment process will also continue.

Language is the dominant characteristic shared by Hispanics. Of the 14.6 million Spanish-origin persons counted by the 1980 census, 11.1 million reported speaking Spanish at home.[40] According to a 1979 Census Bureau survey of language, 93 percent of Hispanic adults reported that Spanish was their primary language when they grew up. Although most of those whose mother tongue is Spanish use it regularly, about one-half speak English as their main language.[41]

The historical segregation of Hispanics, particularly Mexican Americans, has kept many of them out of the cultural, political, and economic mainstream. The Mexican American

population was to a great degree isolated in the Southwest until early in the twentieth century; as noted, significant and sustained Puerto Rican contact with the mainland did not begin until World War II. Inspired by the black civil rights movement of the fifties, sixties, and seventies, Hispanics are currently undergoing a heightening of their sense of group identity and consciousness. This sense of identity has been reinforced by such institutions as government, the media, business, universities, foundations, and churches, which have come to regard Hispanics as worthy of special attention. Business, especially, has made much of the growing Hispanic market, estimated at about $70 billion annually. The increase in bilingual advertising has contributed to a sense of lingusitic identity among the Hispanic population. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan have referred to New York City's ethnic groups as "interest groups"[42]; in that sense, Hispanics constitute a national interest group.

Sociopolitical Strains

The growth of the Hispanic population has increased the potential for social and political strains not only between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites but among Hispanics and between Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and other minorities. Differences in history in the United States, class background, status, age composition, population size, and political strength from one Hispanic group to another work against the political unification of those groups into a single national minority. The term Hispanic itself is artificial; Hispanics are far more likely to describe themselves as Puerto Ricans, or Chicanos, or Cubans. Nor are all issues equally important to each group. Immigration is a priority issue for Mexican Americans but not for Puerto Ricans. The political status of Puerto Rico is of far more interest to Puerto Ricans than to other Hispanics. Domestic social issues are of less concern to Cubans than are U.S. relations with Cuba and with Latin America. Not surprisingly, these differences have led to tensions

between various Hispanic groups, and to political and financial competition among organizations representing different Hispanic constituencies.

Tensions are also evident between Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks, the nation's two largest disadvantaged minorities, which must compete for already limited economic, political, and service resources. The future of the "rainbow coalition" that recently helped elect black mayors in Chicago and Philadelphia remains to be seen. In Miami, for example, tensions exist between the black and Hispanic communities, a result of the economic advancement of the Cuban population in the face of continuing black poverty. The effect of the proximity of Hispanics and blacks in poor neighborhoods--particularly in such cities as Chicago and New York--depends on whether cooperation can be nurtured to the advantage of both groups. Minority neighborhoods, both black and brown, are increasingly threatened by downtown redevelopment as many cities increasingly become populated by only the rich and the poor. Tensions may also rise between Hispanics, Asians and other newcomer groups, and Native Americans in the Southwest and West.

As John Hope Franklin recently observed about blacks, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans:

> One of the tragedies of the present situation is the sense of sharing common problems, and seeking common goals is minimal. It is true that under the circumstances the four groups are natural competitors, since they must scratch around at the bottom of the economic ladder for whatever falls from above. But it is also true that with increased education and greater technical skills, and with a better understanding of the benefits of cooperation, they could effect the kind of intergroup arrangements that would transcend and neutralize many of the divisive forces that exist. In an age of shrinking economic opportunities it is "more tempting for one group to see the other as a potential rival than as an ally," as Joel Dreyfuss has observed. Even so, the alternative to cooperation is a continuation of the crudest forms of bitter group rivalries, energetically promoted by the groups that have always benefitted from such rivalries. The most compelling

argument clearly favors an elimination of suspicions, jealousies, and rivalries, and the adoption of all feasible methods of peaceful cooperation. This is not to suggest that their ultimate goals are, or should be, identical.[43]

Political Participation, Advocacy, and Leadership

Greater political participation by Hispanics would help to alleviate some of the problems they encounter. Despite the attention they are currently receiving in anticipation of the 1984 presidential election, Hispanic participation in the electoral and policy-making processes is limited, their advocacy organizations are few and generally frail, and their sources of new leadership are uncertain.

Census Bureau data show that of the voting age population (those eighteen and older) in November 1982--a nonpresidential-election year--48.5 percent of the population as a whole, 43 percent of blacks, but only 25.3 percent of the Hispanic population voted. Figures for the 1980 election are higher, but the sharp disparity between Hispanics and others remains. Registration figures reflect similar disparities--64 percent of the total population was registered, 59 percent of blacks, but only 36 percent of Hispanics (see Table 6, on page 44). The popular stereotype is that cultural factors, principally the absence of a democratic tradition in the countries of origin of more recent immigrants, account for this lack of electoral participation. Other factors, however, such as the youthfulness of the Hispanic population, are more significant. Hispanic academics and others have shown, moreover, that cultural factors pale in comparison to discrimination, voter registration methods, redistricting, gerrymandering, lack of resources, and periodic voter-list purging as explanations of low Hispanic participation rates.[44] In part as a result of these low voter registration and participation rates, Hispanics are underrepresented in elected office even in the areas in which they are concentrated. For example, more than two million Hispanics live in Los Angeles

Table 6

VOTING-AGE POPULATION REPORTED REGISTERED
AND REGISTERED POPULATION REPORTED TO
HAVE VOTED, NOVEMBER 1982,
BY TOTAL, BLACK, AND SPANISH-ORIGIN

(numbers in thousands)	TOTAL	BLACK	SPANISH-ORIGIN
Total U.S. Voting-Age Population	165,483	17,624	8,765
Percent Reported Registered	64	59	35
Percent Registered Reported Voted	75	71	71

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1982." Current Population Reports. Series P-20, No. 383, November 1983.

County, close to 30 percent of the total population, but none of the five county supervisors is Hispanic, partly a result of the population's dispersion within the county. Not a single member of the Los Angeles City Council is Hispanic. In New York City, where Hispanics comprise 20 percent of the total population, only 6 percent of the City Council, 6 percent of the congressional delegation, 8 percent of the State Assembly delegation, and 7 percent of the State Senate delegation are of Hispanic origin.[45]

Of critical importance to the issue of Hispanic voting is citizenship. Voter registration and electoral participation rates of Hispanics rise significantly if one eliminates from the calculation those voting-age Hispanics who are not yet citizens.[46] (This does not apply, of course, to Puerto Ricans.) Approximately 1.5 million foreign-born Hispanics have been legal U.S. residents for five or more years and are thus eligible for citizenship. This number will increase during the 1980s. The failure of these residents to naturalize has serious consequences. It excludes them from political office and from such other societal institutions as the jury system. It reduces the accountability of elected public officials to large segments of the Hispanic community. Hispanics who do not naturalize forfeit their eligibility to certain federal entitlements, such as student aid, and are ineligible for federal employment. Failure to naturalize may delay reunification with family members who would otherwise be entitled to immediate entry to the United States.

Only a few studies of Hispanics' reluctance to become citizens are available, and these focus exclusively on Mexican immigrants. The studies posit several obstacles to citizenship: (1) allegiance to the country of origin; (2) a mistaken belief that seeking U.S. citizenship could result in deportation or loss of property rights in Mexico; (3) discrimination in the U.S. that would not improve with citizenship; (4) apprehension concerning

the English-language requirement of the citizenship examination; and (5) such administrative obstacles as huge backlogs in the processing of citizenship applications by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which may mean delays of up to five years for those at the end of the queue.

Hispanic underrepresentation in the policy process is also evident in the federal bureaucracy, particularly at the upper levels of policy making. In the Senior Executive Service (SES; the highest civil-service category) in 1982, for example, of the 6,736 SES positions, less than 70 were held by Hispanics, or about 1.7 percent. Of 16,064 social science and evaluation positions, 440 (2.7 percent) are held by Hispanics; in Congress, out of approximately 20,000 staff members, 70 (0.3 percent) are Hispanic.[47] The absence of Hispanics in the "permanent" bureaucracy has obvious implications for the representation of Hispanic interests in the federal policy process, and a similar absence exists at the state level.

Important sources for the development of a Hispanic political voice are national and regional Hispanic organizations, most of which are young and developing. Indeed, a number of them, including the National Council of La Raza, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Aspira of America, and the National Puerto Rican Coalition only came into existence in the late sixties and seventies. Aside from legal defense organizations, however, the number of advocacy and service organizations remains small, their resources scarce and growing scarcer in this period of government retrenchment. Cuts in federal and state expenditures increase the demand for services while reducing the ability of agencies to provide them. Given the poor economic situation of most Hispanics, their advocacy organizations must find ways to reach beyond their constituencies. Some, in recent years, have turned for financial support to foundations and corporations. Many

others, particularly at the local level, have simply ceased to exist.

Of particular importance to Hispanics is the continuing development of leaders who can speak for Hispanic interests in a variety of areas and work effectively to increase Hispanic participation in the national mainstream. Many of the Hispanics consulted by the Foundation during the preparation of this paper expressed concern about the number of promising Hispanic youth who could be the Hispanic leaders of the future but who remain undiscovered and undeveloped. The anti-poverty and community-action programs, created in the sixties and seventies, that might have been a training ground for that new generation are now struggling to survive. The successful resolution of the problems faced by the Hispanic community today and of those it will face in the future requires effective leadership possessed of technical and professional skills and effective organizations to back them up. Helping to develop such leaders and strengthening such organizations is an important goal of the Foundation.

Program Responses

The Ford Foundation's interest in the Hispanic community dates back to the sixties, when efforts on behalf of the civil rights of blacks and other minorities first gained prominence in domestic programming. Since that time, the Foundation has worked to insure that Hispanic concerns are well-represented not only in the civil rights area but in all domestic programs for the disadvantaged. In civil rights, for example, the Foundation helped establish the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund in 1968 and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund in 1972. Both organizations continue to receive Foundation support. To increase Hispanic political participation, the Foundation since 1976 has supported the efforts of the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project in six states in the Southwest, and it is now providing support for similar projects in the Midwest (the Midwest Voter Registration Education Project) and the East (the National Puerto Rican/Hispanic Voter Participation Project).

In the area of community and economic development, Foundation support in 1968 helped create the National Council of La Raza (NCLR; originally the Southwest Council of La Raza), which provides Mexican American communities and organizations with technical assistance and which has also become an effective voice for Mexican Americans and other Hispanics. Economic development has also been the focus of three Hispanic community development corporations (CDCs) that have received substantial Foundation support: the Spanish Speaking Unity Council in Oakland, the Mexican American Unity Council in San Antonio, and Chicanos Por La Causa in Phoenix. Each has increased Hispanic business and employment opportunities, improved and increased the stock of available housing, expanded available social services, and provided on-the-job leadership training. Three Hispanic organizations are included in the Foundation's new program for emerging CDCs.

Implementation of the various Foundation-supported efforts of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, including the Supported Work demonstration and Project Redirection on teenage pregnancy, has involved a number of Hispanic groups. The Child Survival/Fair Start program's concern for the physical and cognitive development of high-risk infants includes support for two projects that work with Mexican-origin populations and another that focuses on the Dominican community on Manhattan's Upper West Side.

Hispanics also participated in the Foundation's graduate fellowship program, begun in 1970, to increase the number of minority Ph.D.'s, and in the Foundation-supported minority postdoctoral fellowship program of the National Academy of Sciences. In addition, the Foundation has sought to increase opportunities for Hispanics and other minorities to move from community colleges into four-year institutions. In secondary education, grants to DePaul University and to the Latino Institute are helping to improve educational opportunities for Hispanic students and to involve Hispanic parents in school affairs in the city of Chicago. Funding has also been provided to the Houston school system for programs reaching Hispanic students and to several other school systems with large numbers of Hispanics. The Foundation's work on the employment problems of unskilled youths will increasingly involve Hispanic participation.

This is also the case with respect to staff work in the area of refugees and migrants, which has particular relevance to the Hispanic population. As described in a recent working paper entitled Refugees and Migrants: Problems and Program Responses, the Foundation's International Affairs, Human Rights and Social Justice, and Urban Poverty programs are jointly addressing the special problems of refugees and migrants, including Hispanic aliens in the United States.[48] The Foundation is pursuing a fourfold approach in responding to the problems created by population movements: research and policy analysis; public

education and dissemination of information; advocacy and litigation; and the improvement of economic self-sufficiency. In view of the significant migration of nationals from Mexico and Central America to the United States, a number of projects receiving Foundation support focus on the impact of migration on these sending countries and on the United States and the particular needs of Hispanic aliens in the United States.

After an extensive program review and wide-ranging discussions with Hispanic leaders, the Foundation has concluded that attention to Hispanic problems and opportunities, over and above its work in those areas to date, is warranted. In the view of the Foundation:

- Additional research on Hispanics is needed to better understand the differing needs of the groups that make up the Hispanic population, and the dynamics of growth, movement, and success within the population.

- Hispanic political and civic participation must increase if Hispanic perspectives and concerns are to be adequately represented in public policy discussions and if Hispanics are to achieve and be accepted for full participation in U.S. society.

- Local Hispanic organizations, to a greater degree than their national counterparts, have had difficulty in obtaining funding to offset federal cutbacks. Grants by the various funders to local community-based organizations for direct service programs are typically small. More support is needed for long-term capacity- and institution-building.

- Hispanics have been stereotyped as "newcomers" and as people concerned with only two issues--immigration and bilingual education. More could and should be done by the communications media to provide adequate information on the full range of Hispanic concerns, the status of the population, and Hispanic contributions to American life.

- As the population grows, strains may increase between Hispanic groups, between Hispanics and other disadvantaged minorities, and between Hispanics and the white majority over resource allocation issues. Efforts to build bridges of communication and understanding between and among Hispanics, other minorities, and whites are thus needed.

- Hispanic economic and educational needs remain great, especially in the Mexican- and Puerto Rican-origin populations. The Puerto Rican community on both the mainland and the island is particularly disadvantaged and underserved by the grantmaking community.

- Community-oriented foundations have not generally approached Hispanic concerns on a programmatic or targeted basis. Opportunities may thus exist for joint funding efforts involving the Ford Foundation and other national and community foundations in areas of Hispanics concentration.

- Though not part of the Foundation's recent exploration, Hispanic projects in the fine arts and the humanities appear to be few in number and limited in scope, indicating another possible area for increased philanthropic support.

In the sixties, the Ford Foundation and other private philanthropies launched a series of major individual and joint efforts to help this nation's black population. The issues, problems, and opportunities faced and posed by the Hispanic population in the United States suggest that, in the eighties, similarly major efforts be undertaken on its behalf as well.

The Ford Foundation recently launched an effort on behalf of Hispanics in the United States in which its work in several grantmaking areas will significantly expand. These areas include research and policy analysis, Hispanic participation in public affairs, and public information and awareness on issues affecting Hispanics and their place in American society. And, because conditions in Puerto Rico have a direct and major impact on the situation of many Hispanics there and on the U.S. mainland, the Foundation is currently exploring the possible establishment of a new funding mechanism to facilitate and encourage expanded philanthropic efforts on the island.

Research and Policy Analysis

The need for reliable and objective information on Hispanics that can inform public debate and decision making has been a recurrent theme in the discussions Foundation staff have had with policy

makers trying to address Hispanic concerns in areas such as employment, education, social services, and political participation. Thus, after consultation with leading members of the Hispanic community, the Foundation in November 1982 created five Hispanic task forces to identify critical research needs. The task forces were organized around the following topics: statistical policy and data needs; civic identity and political participation; education; employment and economic well-being; and social services and community development. Each task force consisted of leading researchers familiar with Hispanic concerns and leaders of advocacy and community service groups. At the end of a six-month period, each task force was asked to recommend topics for policy research. The National Chicano Council on Higher Education provided overall coordination of the effort.

The task forces first met in late 1982 and continued to meet until the early summer of 1983. Final reports were completed in the fall. These reports document both important data and research gaps and, in some instances, the need for important institutional reforms to increase knowledge of the Hispanic population.

The task force on statistical policy and data needs noted access problems faced by potential users of census data who do not have either a university base or access to powerful computers. The task force on community development and social services, recognizing the gap that often develops between university-based academic research and the needs of policy makers and community advocates and organizations, stressed the need to encourage "network models" between academic institutions and national and local community organizations to bring research expertise to bear on community problems and to assist in the evaluation of service programs. It also pointed out that academic research too often overemphasizes quantitative, highly structured research and that it frequently overlooks qualitative case-study and observational techniques that may be of greater value to community groups for

understanding local problems and the short-run effectiveness of their programs. A major recommendation of the task force on political participation and civic identity was the creation of a national data bank on Hispanic political participation, preferably utilizing a regional consortium approach that would allow various institutions to participate in its creation and maintenance and increase its accessibility.

The five task forces recommended a number of areas for policy study and other work, areas that could be supported by the Ford Foundation and/or by other funders. Among their key recommendations were:

Statistical Policy and Data Needs

the implementation of a detailed special intercensal survey of Hispanics to track the population's growth, heterogeneity, and migration patterns at mid-decade.

Social Services and Community Development

research on the economic condition of Hispanic communities, including national-level and cross-site comparative area studies that take into account population trends, capital development, and investment and employment trends.

Employment and Economic Well-Being

research on the impact on Hispanic employment of business and labor market characteristics, and on employment differences between native-born and immigrant Hispanics.

Political Participation and Civic Identity

analyses of Hispanic electoral activity, including basic demographic data by political jurisdiction; information on registration, voter turnout, and voting results.

Education

analyses of factors contributing to Hispanic school attrition and their impact on various Hispanic subgroups, and of bilingual education and cognitive language development.

A summary of the task forces' recommendations is now in preparation, and should be ready for dissemination to Hispanic scholars, community leaders, and other interested researchers for comment later this year.

It is critically important to reinforce and strengthen the capacity of Hispanic research entities to carry out policy research projects. One promising endeavor in this respect is a newly created Inter-University Program in Chicano and Puerto Rican Research (IUP), blending the talents of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriquenos at Hunter College in New York, the Chicano Studies Center at Stanford University, the Mexican American Studies Center at the University of Texas at Austin, and the Chicano Research Center at UCLA. A planning grant has been provided to this group to develop comparative research on the Hispanic communities in the San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, San Antonio, and New York. It is unique in its attempt to bring Chicano and Puerto Rican scholars together in a systematic effort to study common problems facing both Spanish-origin groups. The consortium will study differences and commonalities among Latin Americans, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans and their adjustment within particular cities and labor markets.

Other, locally oriented policy research centers will also be encouraged to provide ongoing research and monitoring of local policy developments. This kind of locally targeted, short-term research encourages public officials to respond quickly to Hispanic issues that arise on the local public agenda. One model for this kind of work is the Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, Inc., operating in New York City, which has published research on the under-registration of the Puerto Rican community in the city and on opportunities for increasing the participation of Puerto Ricans in the city's electoral process. The institute has also examined the representation of Hispanics in the state workforce under the Cuomo administration. These reports have attracted the attention of the press and have served to encourage policy debates

on these issues as well as to heighten the sensitivity of public officials to these concerns. A small planning grant has been provided to the institute, and Foundation staff are studying its operation and progress for possible replication elsewhere.

Finally, the Foundation will explore sponsorship of local conferences that bring together relevant leaders and policy makers to consider the significance of the growing Hispanic presence in the United States. One model for this kind of conference is a recent Foundation-sponsored meeting in Puerto Rico organized by the Puerto Rican Family Institute, a meeting that brought together New York City and Puerto Rican government officials to explore the needs of Puerto Rican families who migrate between New York and the island.

Participation in Public Affairs

Citizenship. Increasing the naturalization rate among eligible Hispanic resident aliens would encourage greater Hispanic participation in civic life. For this reason, the Foundation is planning a new initiative in cooperation with the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) Education Fund. The project will begin with a survey to derive a better understanding of the target population, its characteristics, and its attitudes toward naturalization in the five U.S. cities with the largest Hispanic populations: Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Antonio. A second aspect of the project will be a citizenship conference of scholars, government officials, and community representatives to analyze the reasons for the low rates of Hispanic naturalization. Discussions will be designed to increase awareness of the problem, to explore potential model programs, and to identify problem areas. Based on these first steps, various strategies will be designed and implemented in a national demonstration.

In addition to working to increase citizenship rates among Hispanics, the Foundation will seek opportunities to increase civic participation by involving Hispanics in group activities designed to educate them to community needs and issues, helping them to participate in community decision making, and involving them in mainstream political affairs. Disadvantaged Hispanics will thus be encouraged to seek a greater stake in the country's future, to reduce their alienation from the system, and to improve their social, economic, and political situation.

Leadership Development. The continuing development of a leadership cadre is needed to focus attention on and to support the diverse needs of the Hispanic community. No other single recommendation was mentioned as frequently by Hispanics and non-Hispanics consulted in the preparation of this paper. A strong cadre of leaders can not only speak out on behalf of Hispanic interests but through their involvement can create opportunities for greater Hispanic participation in the national mainstream. Their presence in a variety of policy-making leadership positions provides role models for promising younger members of the community whose talents might otherwise remain undiscovered and underutilized, an all-too-frequent occurrence in disadvantaged communities.

The Foundation, through various efforts, is indirectly helping to identify and provide opportunities for emerging Hispanic leaders, as, for example, in its support of Hispanic community development corporations and other Hispanic programs that provide important on-the-job leadership training opportunities. A concurrent, direct approach to leadership development, however, is appropriate at this time. The Foundation has thus initiated a Hispanic Leadership Development Program (HLDP) that is designed to meet the following objectives: to identify potential Hispanic leaders; to reinforce their commitment to serving the Hispanic community; and to provide them with the

training and practical experience needed to increase their effectiveness. The program will serve different age/experience levels, extending from older high school students to those Hispanics already working in public-service fields or already on their way to becoming community leaders. The primary goal will be to increase the pool of qualified and committed individuals from which leaders are spawned. The program will be designed to identify especially promising individuals and, through internships and fellowships, to encourage them to pursue leadership roles in political, governmental, or other public-service-related careers. Supplemental activities will educate participants to a variety of career options in service to their communities and present a broad range of role models. Given the diversity of the Hispanic population and the need for its representation at all levels, the program will provide experiences and exposure to local, state, and national affairs.

To help design the program and provide guidance on the selection of participants and grantees, Foundation staff are establishing a Hispanic Leadership Development Advisory Board (HLDAB) composed of leaders of the various country-of-origin constituencies. While Hispanics will be in the majority, prominent non-Hispanics experienced in leadership development activities will also be represented. An additional responsibility of the HLDAB will be to focus public attention on the program so that it is viewed as a means of recognizing outstanding potential and merit in the Hispanic community.

Infrastructure Development. Recent cutbacks in federal support of national Hispanic advocacy groups have increased the fragility of the groups and hence their ability to defend Hispanic interests. Moreover, there has been a shift among several organizations from service provision to policy monitoring, analysis, and advocacy--less costly endeavors for which private support has been available from national funders. The Foundation expects to

continue its program of limited general support to such organizations, including such recent grant recipients as the National Council of La Raza and the National Puerto Rican Coalition.

General support for national organizations, however, must be balanced against the needs of local groups hard hit by funding cutbacks. To meet the needs of local groups, the Foundation plans to support selected local forums that enable Hispanic organizations and leaders to examine common Hispanic problems and approaches to those problems, and to better define their needs. The Foundation expects to fund activities of this kind in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, San Antonio, and Chicago, promoting intergroup cooperation wherever possible.

The Foundation is also supporting conferences of researchers, program operators, public officials, and other policy makers on Hispanic policy issues as well as other efforts to facilitate communication among Hispanic policy professionals. A different approach to communication among Hispanic officials is the creation of a roster of Hispanic elected officials, sponsored by the NALEO Education Fund, similar to one for black officials prepared and published by the Joint Center for Political Studies. Through periodic updating, such a roster also serves as an important way to measure the progress of Hispanics in obtaining elective office. The Foundation has provided partial support for this project.

Public Information and Awareness

Given the potential for increased intergroup tension, it is important to reduce popular misconceptions about Hispanics, inform both Hispanics and non-Hispanics about the issues that concern and affect this population, and make known the cultural, economic, and social contributions of Hispanics to society. La Raza Production Center, Inc., with Foundation support, has taken a significant step in this regard. The center's programming is designed to

educate both Hispanic and non-Hispanic audiences on the status, concerns, and contributions of Hispanic Americans. In the fall of 1983, its first project, Latin Tempo, an English-language, half-hour news feature program, expanded to seventeen major television markets. A second, HispanUs, underwritten by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, is producing four one-hour documentaries on Hispanic Americans for public television. Currently under development is New World Theater, which will produce feature-length films for television based on selected works of Latin American literature.

A second effort along similar lines is a grant for partial support of a book tentatively entitled Hispanics-U.S.A., by Joseph Monserrat. The aim of the project is to write a comprehensive overview of the Hispanic population in the United States for a lay audience. The volume will explain the history of the Hispanic groups in the United States, their contributions to American culture and its institutions, and their current place in American society. In doing so, it will differentiate among the major Hispanic groups, explaining their differences both historically and in terms of the particular concerns that currently differentiate one group from another. Also expected to receive Foundation support are special editions of mainstream policy journals on Hispanic issues.

Finally, the Foundation is exploring ways to increase communication between blacks and Hispanics.[49] A previous effort at a national coalition, the National Committee on Hispanics and Blacks, made a promising beginning at building a national agenda. It also provided a forum for discussion of black-Hispanic differences and points of convergence on various issues. Funding crises in various agencies involved in the effort precluded further development of the coalition. Foundation staff are currently exploring whether reinstituting the coalition is feasible.

Puerto Rico

The indigenous population of the island of Puerto Rico suffers high rates of poverty and disadvantage. Island unemployment is officially noted at 22 percent, but the true rate may be closer to 30 or 40 percent. Agricultural production is in decline, light industry has failed to grow, and the heavy industry that was expected to increase employment dramatically has failed to do so. Operation Bootstrap, the driving force behind the island's rapid industrialization and the "economic miracle" that turned the island into a model of development for the Caribbean, appears to have stopped dead in its tracks. From a GNP that rose at an average annual rate of 5.3 percent in the fifties and a 7.0 percent rate in the sixties (expressed in constant 1972 dollars), the island's GNP nosedived in the period immediately following the 1973 oil crisis to 1.3 percent in 1974 from 7.3 the year before. This led to an extraordinary increase in U.S. federal disbursements, including transfer payments: $4.4 billion in 1982, 35 percent of the island's GNP. Heavy dependence on those transfer payments, however, took its toll when funds were cut in the first two years of the Reagan administration. CETA cuts cost the island 25,000 jobs and added 2 percent to the island's unemployment rolls; funds for food and nutrition were combined into a block grant; and Puerto Ricans did not benefit from federal tax cuts because islanders do not pay federal income taxes but do pay a steep commonwealth tax.

The Foundation has supported research on the impact of federal budget cuts on Puerto Rico that supplements studies being conducted at Princeton University and the Urban Institute. A grant was provided to the National Puerto Rican Coalition to expand a study of the impact of CETA cuts on mainland Puerto Ricans to cover the island population. Further exploration on this topic may lead to research on the current economic relationship between Puerto Rico and Washington and to a

reanalysis of the assumptions underlying the Bootstrap strategy in light of today's economy.

It ought to be recognized, however, that the economic issues in this relationship are difficult to separate from the extremely sensitive issue of political status. The Foundation has addressed the status issue through grants to increase public awareness of Puerto Rico's evolving status and to promote analyses of the complex problems that underlie the surface simplicity of the commonwealth, statehood, and independence options. Additional support for similar work is currently under consideration.

Finally, the Foundation has been exploring ways to increase philanthropic activity by mainland funders in Puerto Rico. Over the past thirty years, both Puerto Rican and federal tax incentives have made it attractive for a large number of corporations to open plants in Puerto Rico. Despite the recent decline of the Puerto Rican economy, corporations continue to benefit from the various tax incentives provided to them by the Internal Revenue Code and local tax laws. The U.S. Treasury reported that federal tax exemptions in 1981 saved corporations with facilities in Puerto Rico approximately $1.2 billion in corporate income taxes. At the same time, it would appear that corporations based in Puerto Rico could expand, and are willing to consider expanding, their philanthropic activities on the island. At a fund-raising seminar held by the National Puerto Rican Coalition in Puerto Rico this past summer, it was suggested that a significant obstacle to increased corporate philanthropy was the absence of an effective mechanism to receive and channel funding to worthy projects on the island. For example, it was suggested that requests for corporate support from local applicants fall into a limbo between local plant managers who lack the authority to provide significant funding for philanthropic activities, and corporate headquarters staff on the mainland who lack the knowledge or means to evaluate such requests. National foundations also have generally lacked the expertise to undertake

island-based activities. An island-based funding mechanism created for directing mainland corporate and foundation donations to where they are needed most and can do the most good thus could play an important role in increasing funding support for island-based projects.

Conclusion

Until now, the Ford Foundation has included Hispanics in a variety of programs serving the disadvantaged, as one group among many in need. The Foundation's examination of the Hispanic condition, however, suggests that this approach is no longer sufficient. What Hispanics have need of today is what blacks needed twenty-five years ago: greater knowledge and understanding of their economic, social, and political situation and of the roots of their disadvantage, and the development of an infrastructure that will increase their participation in the mainstream of society.

The Hispanic population in the United States and U.S. society as a whole face difficult problems and issues in coming to grips with the growing size of the Hispanic population, its needs, and the maintenance of its identity in our pluralistic society. The approaches described in this paper, the Foundation believes, will help inform and enlighten the public debate and public policy at a time when detailed and specific information is badly needed by policy makers about the Hispanic population, not only with respect to its current status and diversity but also in terms of the future. They will enable Hispanics to participate more fully both in society and in the policy-making and advocacy processes that affect their lives. They concentrate Foundation attention where Hispanics are concentrated--metropolitan and urban centers in a limited number of states. In addition, the approach with respect to Puerto Rico recognizes both the real needs of the island and the neglect of mainland funders from which the island has suffered. Too often, Puerto Rico has been allowed to "slip through the cracks," either through oversight or perceived funding obstacles that have been easier to ignore than to attempt to overcome.

The reality is that we face a future where the Hispanic population will continue to grow, whether or not undocumented

immigration is effectively reduced. The Hispanic influence from Puerto Rico, Mexico, and other Latin American countries will keep the Spanish language and Hispanic culture alive in this country for a long time to come. The process of adjustment for Hispanics and non-Hispanics alike will not be easy. The Ford Foundation hopes to play a useful role in helping to make that adjustment successful, and hopes that other philanthropic organizations--as well as other concerned institutions and individuals--will join in the important work that remains to be done.

NOTES

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